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Abstract
Historical empathy or perspective taking has been a bone of contention in studies 
on history teaching, and the concept remains ill-defined. This may have been 
caused by a lack of theoretical reflection, as well as by the application of diverse 
research methods: a more cognitive or ‘rational’ explanation of the concept 
has often been substantiated by quantitative methods, while the more affective 
dimension has regularly been explored by qualitative methods. In this contribution, 
we trace some theoretical backgrounds of ‘empathy’ in historical theory as well 
as social psychology. Then we present a mixed-methods study employing a 
quantitative standardized measure developed in previous research in Germany 
and the Netherlands, as well as qualitative measurements. Results suggest that 
while, on the one hand, the standardized measure proved to be unreliable, both 
quantitative and qualitative methods can shed more light on what is going on 
when students try to take the point of view of historical agents. Based on theory, 
as well as our explorations, our conclusion is that empathy or perspective taking 
should be seen as a cognitive operation. We propose to see the reconstruction 
of historical perspectives as a specific element of historical explanation, not as a 
separate concept of ‘historical empathy’ or ‘historical perspective taking’.
Keywords: historical empathy; historical explanation; historical perspective; 
historical thinking; the Netherlands
Introduction
The reconstruction of the perspectives of historical agents in order to better understand 
and explain their utterances and actions is generally regarded as an important element 
in historical thinking as it should be taught in schools (Barton and Levstik, 2004: 208; 
Cunningham, 2009; Downey, 1995; Foster, 1999; Lee and Ashby, 2001; Seixas and 
Morton, 2013: 138; Shemilt, 1984). A competence or propensity that is often connected 
to this reconstruction activity is ‘historical empathy’ – a term referring to the inclination 
or ability to imagine how people in the past must have thought or felt, given their 
perceptions of reality, their convictions and beliefs (Dulberg, 2002; Lévesque, 2008: 142; 
Yilmaz, 2007). Empathy is also often given the broader meaning of understanding or 
explaining human actions and thoughts in the past, in which case it virtually coincides 
with reconstruction of historical perspectives.
The discussion about historical empathy in history education has been going 
on since the 1980s (Boddington, 1980; Stockley, 1983; Knight, 1989) and continues 
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(Endacott and Brooks, 2013; Huijgen et al., 2017; Rantala et al., 2016; Virta and Kouki, 
2014) without consensus being reached about the exact meaning of the concept or 
its correct application in history teaching. It is striking that the educational debate 
hardly refers to the debate about historical explanation in historical theory, nor to 
social psychology about empathy and perspective taking, with the notable exception 
of Nilsen (2016), who explicitly connects historical understanding to social psychology. 
In our theoretical framework, we try to make some connections between history 
education and historical and psychological theory.
The confusion about the concept may also have been caused by the fact that 
very diverse research methods have been applied. While the majority of history 
education researchers draw upon both qualitative and quantitative research methods, 
as appropriate, some research has been exclusively qualitative (for example, Brooks, 
2008; Endacott, 2014), while others have employed purely quantitative methods 
(for example, Hartmann and Hasselhorn, 2008; Huijgen et al., 2014). Qualitative 
studies usually result in accentuating the ‘affective’ component of ‘empathy’, while 
quantitative studies show an inclination to stress the ‘rational’ and ‘cognitive’ features. 
Therefore, we present a study based on mixed methods (Kelle, 2006), which may shed 
light on the conceptual problem of historical perspective reconstruction. By means 
of quantitative measurements we want to explore if and how progress in the skill of 
historical perspective reconstruction can be determined, while qualitative exploration 
can shed light on how students experience their activities in this respect, and whether 
these experiences point towards a more affective or more cognitive interpretation of 
the concept.
Theoretical framework 
Theories on historical explanations in historical theory, as well as social-psychological 
theories on empathy and perspective taking, may be employed to clarify the concept 
of historical perspective reconstruction in history education. For reasons of space, only 
very sketchy outlines of these theories can be presented here. 
A major controversy in historical theory has been the one between a hermeneutic 
and a positivist deductive-nomological approach to historical explanations. An 
important scholar representing the hermeneutic point of view was the German 
philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), who argued that a distinction should be 
made between explanation in the natural sciences and in the human sciences, because 
the latter not only deal with visible things, but also with their meaning, which cannot be 
observed directly (Dilthey and Jameson, 1972). Understanding of meanings can only 
arise by means of interpretation (verstehen), based on a shared humanity of people 
in the past and in the present. The problem here is how to understand something 
alien, which is not shared, and which is arguably the object of the historian wishing to 
understand the ‘strangeness’ of the past. Dilthey was aware of this, but still believed 
that interpretation was the key, because however strangely people in the past thought 
and acted, nothing ‘explainable’ about them could be totally alien:
Interpretation would be impossible if the expressions of life 
[Lebensäusserungen] were completely alien. It would be unnecessary if 
there was nothing alien to them. So interpretation lies between these two 
extremes. It is required wherever there is something alien which should be 
turned into familiar by means of the art of interpretation. (Dilthey, 1981: 
278–9 [our translation]) 
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An important auxiliary for constructing correct interpretations is, according to 
hermeneutic theory, a thorough knowledge of context: the individual can be understood 
by means of reference to the ‘whole’, while the whole can only be understood in the 
way it is built up by its individual parts (Skinner, 1975). It is this cyclic character of 
hermeneutics that causes the concept to be contested by its critics (Tully, 1988). 
A similar position to Dilthey’s was taken by the British philosopher Robin 
Collingwood (1889–1943), who stated that historians explain the past by re-enacting 
past thoughts in their own minds, imagining past realities as they must have appeared 
to historical agents (Collingwood, 1973: 282–3). His theory probably influenced the 
anglophone debate on empathy in history teaching a great deal (see, for example, 
Stockley, 1983; Shemilt, 1984; Lee et al., 1997).
In opposition to hermeneutic philosophers, Carl Hempel (1905–97) took the view 
that there is only one form of science: the positivist, empiricist deductive-nomological 
way of thinking of the natural sciences (Hempel, 1942). Unless historical explanations 
could refer to general laws (whenever A happens, B is the consequence), they would 
be no scientific explanations at all (ibid.: 37–8). Hermeneutic understanding could at 
most be a heuristic device, but not provide a satisfactory explanation (ibid.: 44).
Hempel’s radical dismissal of hermeneutics gave rise to much debate, because 
the scientific status of history was at stake. Very few historical explanations could 
be based on general laws, because human behaviour is often unpredictable (Dray, 
1957: 7–13). The solution offered by William Dray (1921–2009) – the model of ‘rational 
understanding’ – seemed to correspond most closely to what historians actually 
do. They describe: (1) the factual situation as it was perceived by a historical agent; 
(2) the probable consequences (as foreseen by the agent) of a range of actions that the 
agent believed to be feasible options; and (3) the goals the agent wanted to achieve. 
From a combination of these three, historians deduce rationally the explanation for 
the choices the agent made (Dray, 1989: 18). Thus, while general laws were dismissed, 
rational deduction was retained, as well as empirical facts, without resorting to 
something as vague as empathically trying to feel and think like people in the past. 
Strikingly enough, almost exactly this model of rational understanding was presented 
by history educator Peter Lee (1984: 90), without reference to Dray.
Several issues raised in the debate on historical empathy in history education 
can be related to the debate in historical theory. The idea of ‘entering into the minds’ 
of people in the past, first dismissed in the discussion as something that does not 
represent empathy (Foster, 1999; Knight, 1989; Lee and Ashby, 2001; Shemilt, 1984; 
Stockley, 1983), and then miraculously revived as something that is essential to empathy 
(Brooks, 2008; Endacott, 2010; Endacott and Brooks, 2013; Harris and Foreman-Peck, 
2004; Kohlmeier, 2006), can easily be related to the debate about hermeneutics. The 
problem of ‘hermeneutic naïveté’ (Megill, 1989: 636), is assuming that the personality 
of the researcher plays no role in his interpretation, thus guaranteeing the ‘objectivity’ 
of the result of a hermeneutic procedure. In fact, the opposite is the case, and this 
also applies to history education. While some researchers argue that comparing one’s 
own similar experiences to those of people in the past positively influences historical 
understanding (Endacott, 2014; Kohlmeier, 2006), others state that it may lead to 
‘mind-numbing presentism that reads the present onto the past’ (Wineburg, 1999: 
493). Some empirical results indicate that students do ‘fill the gaps’ with presentist 
imagination, especially in cases in which they are asked to ‘imagine themselves in the 
past’ (Brooks, 2008; Cunningham, 2003: 260; De Leur et al., 2017; Huijgen et al., 2017; 
Rantala, 2011). In this context, it is also frequently being stressed that students should 
respect the differences between present and past, and the distance that separates us 
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from people of bygone days (Downey, 1995; Foster, 1999; Phillips, 2004; Shemilt, 1984; 
Wineburg, 1999). However, it is difficult to see how this could be reconciled with active 
engagement of one’s own experiences when trying to explain people in the past.
Context is another aspect of hermeneutics that can be applied to the discussion. 
Research in history education has shown that it is often a lack of contextual knowledge 
that impedes correct reconstructions of historical perspectives by students (Downey, 
1995; Foster, 1999; Rantala, 2011). Especially Berti et al. (2009) have shown that the model 
of progression in historical empathy that Lee et al. had been building up, based on 
the ‘disposition’ for empathy or the ability of students to empathize in different stages 
of development (Lee et al., 1997; Lee and Ashby, 2001), could, in fact, be attributed to 
the availability or lack of enough background information understandable to students.
Social psychology shows that social perspective taking should be interpreted 
first and foremost as an element of face-to-face interaction between people in the 
present, referring to things such as conflict resolution (Gehlbach, 2004a). It appears 
to be correlated only very weakly with the ability to reconstruct the perspectives of 
historical agents (Gehlbach, 2004b). The essential element of historical distance, 
of ‘strangeness’ of past thoughts and actions, is no part of it. This justifies Knight’s 
(1989: 44) critical statement on historical empathy: ‘Any useful psychological findings 
about how people empathize with others who are in a reciprocal relationship with them 
are of little use to the educationalist interested in how to promote understandings of 
those who are in no such relationship’.
Psychological theory may also be related to the question of whether we are talking 
about a purely cognitive ability, or (also) about an affective inclination or disposition. 
The affective element obviously plays an important role in social perspective taking 
(Hoffman, 2000: 4). However, the history educators Barton and Levstik (2004: 229–41) 
introduced the element of ‘caring’ in their theory of empathy, followed by others 
stressing the importance of the affective component (Brooks, 2011; Endacott, 2010). 
Endacott and Brooks (2013: 43) state that students should ‘affectively connect’ to past 
agents to be able to understand their seemingly irrational behaviour, which, if judged 
only rationally, would lead to ill-founded condescending attitudes. This seems to be 
an erroneous application of social-psychological theory. While in everyday human 
interaction, affective connections do play a role, understanding ‘strange’ actions 
and thoughts in the past is not a matter of sharing feelings, but – on the contrary – 
a matter of rational use of the available contextual information that makes strange 
actions understandable and justifiable. Affective reactions to past behaviour, rather 
than cognitive understanding, probably give rise to presentist and condescending 
attitudes that we wish to avoid. As Berti et al. (2009) have shown, the availability of 
adequate background information is decisive.
Theories about the affective component of historical empathy may also have 
been derived from the motivational aspect of social perspective taking (Gehlbach, 
2004a). Taking the perspective of someone else is not only a matter of ability, but 
also of propensity or motivation to do so, which is indeed a matter of feeling rather 
than cognitive deliberation. However, Gehlbach (ibid.: 211) points out that the result 
of a willingness, whether or not propelled by affective considerations, may either be 
a correct or an incorrect estimate of someone else’s thoughts and feelings. The risk 
of a wrong estimate is considerable, because empathy is inherently biased by one’s 
own thoughts and feelings (Bloom, 2016: 31, 68, 108). Incorrect estimations are mostly 
due to a lack of correct information, and this is also the case in daily interactions with 
fellow human beings. Transferred to the educational context, we may conclude that 
the inclination to reconstruct historical perspectives could be seen as the motivation 
78 Wilschut and Schiphorst
History Education Research Journal 16 (1) 2019
to study history seriously, or, in more general terms: the motivation to learn, which is 
indeed a partly affective endeavour (Immordino-Yang and Damasio, 2007). But this 
is not restricted to perspective reconstruction in history, or especially related to it. If 
mistakes are made in the correct estimation of thoughts and feelings of people in the 
past, it is mostly due to a lack of, or defective study of, contextual information.
Lévesque (2008: 163–8) more or less summarizes the available research in a three-
stage model of teaching ‘historical empathy’: imagining, contextualizing and judging. 
Imagining is a necessary first step to create a lively representation of the historical 
situation for students to be able to picture it and to raise questions. Contextualization 
is the backbone of understanding the situation, as argued above. Judging is advised by 
Lévesque because, given the fact that students somehow always implicitly have some 
judgement about ‘strange’ things in the past, it seems better to make such judging 
processes explicit in order to relate them in orderly ways to the available contextual 
information.
Summing up, explaining utterances and actions of past agents is mostly a 
matter of rational understanding, as described by Dray (1957). Essential to the correct 
explanation of strange past utterances and behaviours is the availability of contextual 
information and the motivation of students to take this into account. If historical 
context is lacking, or if students fail to study it seriously, this often results in ‘filling the 
gaps’ by presentist notions. This explains why Hartmann and Hasselhorn (2008), in their 
search for a standardized measure for historical perspective taking, found a reliable 
bipolar component representing ‘contextualization’ on the one end and ‘present 
oriented perspective taking’ on the other. Next to these two, they discerned taking 
into account ‘the role of the historical actor’, which focuses specifically on the personal 
situation of an agent. This could be seen as an in-between position between presentist 
judgements and contextualized judgements, because it elicits bringing in one’s own 
perspective as well as context: ‘if I were him in that situation, I would …’. This model, 
which has also been applied by Huijgen et al. (2014, 2017), has been used as one of the 
quantitative measures in the empirical study presented below.
Method
We designed a small-scale explorative intervention study to find out whether students’ 
abilities to reconstruct historical perspectives could be improved, and whether Hartmann 
and Hasselhorn’s (2008) ‘standardized measure’ could be used to demonstrate such 
improvements. We also wanted to know how students reflected upon their activities of 
perspective reconstruction, and whether they experienced these mainly as something 
cognitive or something affective. Therefore, we used a mixed methods pre-/post-test 
design with an intervention group and a comparison group.
Participants 
Participants in the intervention group and comparison group were 36 and 33 tenth-
grade students (age 15–16) respectively from one secondary school located near 
Utrecht in the Netherlands in a white, middle-class neighbourhood. The school 
provides general secondary education (HAVO) and pre-university education (VWO), 
that is, the middle and higher streams of Dutch secondary education. As history is 
a compulsory subject in the Netherlands up to the ninth grade (age 14–15), these 
students had opted for history as one of their final examination subjects. Students 
from this school perform above average in the national state examinations. Both the 
intervention and comparison groups contained proportionally equal numbers of HAVO 
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and VWO students. Because they were parallel groups in the school, their composition 
and performances were comparable. Measurements on our pre-test revealed no 
significant differences between the intervention group and the comparison group.
Intervention 
The intervention was based on Lévesque’s (2008: 163–8) three-stage model of historical 
empathy. Students studied the thoughts and acts of two controversial historical 
persons: Maximilien Robespierre’s radical application of revolutionary principles and 
Thomas Jefferson’s debatable conduct as a slave-owner, each during three lessons of 
50 minutes each (a total of six lessons). In each of the two cases, students’ imagining of 
the situation was first stimulated by means of audiovisuals, play-reading and primary 
sources. Then, contextual information was provided by reiterating the main outlines 
of the period (which had been studied by students before in their general courses 
on history) and studying further primary and secondary sources representing multiple 
perspectives. Finally, judging the past was stimulated by whole-class discussions, 
followed by having students write short essays on their judgement of the conduct of 
these historical agents, stimulating them to make the values of the period and present-
day values explicit. An instruction card was produced that expounded the three stages 
of imagining, contextualizing and judging, each with their focus questions: 
•	 Stage	1,	imagining:	In	which	period	is	this	happening?	What	do	I	know	about	this	
period?	What	comes	to	my	mind	when	imagining	this	period?
•	 Stage	2,	contextualizing:	What	were	the	backgrounds	of	the	person	I	am	dealing	
with?	What	were	his	personal	beliefs	and	convictions?	In	what	kind	of	society	did	
this	person	live	and	what	were	the	dominant	values,	beliefs	and	opinions?
•	 Stage	3,	judging:	What	are	my	personal	perceptions	of	this	historical	topic	and	
how	 do	 they	 influence	 my	 judgement?	 What	 differences	 are	 there	 between	
the	standards	and	values	 today	and	those	of	 this	period?	Am	I	able	 to	 judge	
the	 conduct	 of	 this	 person,	 balancing	 all	 information?	 If	 so,	 what	 would	 my	
judgement	be?
Research questions 
Because we were interested to know whether perspective reconstruction in history 
lessons can be improved, and whether a possible improvement can be assessed by 
means of quantitative and qualitative measures, we formulated the following research 
questions:
1. Can a possible improvement of historical perspective reconstruction as a result of 
an intervention based on Lévesque’s (2008: 163–8) three-stage model be assessed 
effectively	by	means	of	Hartmann	and	Hasselhorn’s	(2008)	standardized	measure?
2. Are the results of quantitative measurements confirmed or contradicted by the 
results of qualitative methods to gauge improvements in historical perspective 
reconstruction?
3. How did students reflect on their attempts to improve their historical perspective 
reconstruction?
Measurements 
In order to assess a possible improvement in the ability of the intervention group 
students to reconstruct historical perspectives, we designed two adapted versions 
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of Hartmann and Hasselhorn’s (2008) standardized measure. This instrument consists 
of a description of the situation of a person in the past, followed by a choice the 
person should make (in Hartmann and Hasselhorn’s original case: is the person going 
to	vote	for	Hitler	or	not?).	The	student	then	has	to	make	up	his	or	her	mind	about	nine	
statements, three of which represent a ‘presentist’ motivated choice, three a choice 
motivated specifically from the situation of the agent, and three a choice motivated 
from the historical context in which the agent finds himself or herself. For each of the 
statements, students are asked to estimate whether or not it fits the situation of the 
agent on a four-point scale (varying from fits not at all to fits very well). Our adapted 
versions of this instrument described the situation of a nineteenth-century factory girl, 
Anna, who is faced with the dilemma of joining a strike or not, and the situation of an 
eleventh-century French farmer, Joseph, who has to make up his mind whether he will 
join a crusade. We deliberately chose two situations different from the ones studied 
during the intervention, because we wanted to see the results in terms of perspective 
reconstruction as such, not in terms of perspective reconstruction in a specific context 
that had been studied, in which case reproduction of specific knowledge could also 
play a role. We chose two different situations for the pre-test and post-test because we 
wanted to avoid the test/re-test effect, and because we wanted to check if Hartmann 
and Hasselhorn’s (2008) measurement is in fact ‘standard’, meaning irrespective of the 
historical content to which it is being applied.
Example statements of the three kinds described above are:
Presentist: (1) Anna should not join the strike. She will be better off in the factory in 
order to get a good training. With a better education she will have a much better 
chance to get a good job, and that will change her living and working conditions.
(2) Peter the Hermit says it is ‘God’s will’ to fight against the ‘infidels’ in the east. Since 
there is no way to prove that Peter is right, Joseph will not join.
Situation of agent: (1) One of Anna’s friends is planning to strike. Her situation is as 
bad as Anna’s and her family also has a hard time. If Anna is to show solidarity, she has 
to decide to join the strike.
(2) Joseph’s youngest daughter is seriously ill. Joseph feels he has to make a sacrifice 
to God, so that the poor child will be cured. This will influence his decision to go on 
a crusade.
Context: (1) The chances are that Anna will lose her job if she strikes. There is great 
unemployment in her city. Every week, poor farmers from the countryside pour into the 
city in search of work.
(2) Joseph is an extremely religious man: if the supreme leader of the Church makes an 
appeal to fight for Christianity, it is his duty to respond to it.
The eighteen items were presented to two experts in random order, with a short 
description of the categories ‘presentist’, ‘situation of agent’ and ‘context’. The experts 
assigned them to the correct categories with an agreement of 89 per cent.
The factory girl case was used as pre-test and the crusade case was used as post-
test. Our descriptions of the situations of historical agents were somewhat lengthier 
(about 400 words) than the one provided in Hartmann and Hasselhorn’s (2008) 
original case (about 300 words), in order to be able to provide enough contextual 
information. The instruments were applied simultaneously in the intervention group 
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and the comparison group before and after the intervention period, during which the 
comparison group had received ‘business as usual’ history education.
The second instrument was a short essay assignment added to the cases 
described above. Students were informed about the choices that Anna and Joseph 
eventually made, and then asked to describe how they evaluated this decision: ‘Joseph 
finally	decided	to	leave	with	his	family	to	go	on	a	crusade.	What	do	you	think	of	this?	
Do	you	agree	or	disagree?	Give	as	many	arguments	as	possible	to	substantiate	your	
answer.’ In order not to influence the first quantitative measurement, this qualitative 
assignment was only given to the students after they had handed in their quantitative 
scores, but during the same session, which ensured that they could still envisage the 
historical situation well. This instrument was applied in the intervention group as well 
as in the comparison group.
The third instrument was a so-called ‘learner report’ (De Groot, 1974), an 
instrument with open questions that incite students to reflect upon their learning 
process. Our instrument contained these questions: 
•	 The	most	important	thing	I	learned	in	these	lessons	was	…	
•	 I	learned	this	mainly	through	…	
•	 Judging	people	and	situations	in	the	past	is	often	awkward,	because	…	
•	 If	you	wish	to	empathize	with	people	in	the	past,	you	always	have	to	consider	…	
•	 I	have	found	it	useful/not	useful	 to	 learn	about	how	to	reason	about	the	past	
instead of just learning facts about the past, because … 
•	 After	these	lessons,	I	will	probably	make	use	of	the	three-stages	model	frequently/
sometimes/never, because … 
This instrument was only used in the intervention group, because the comparison 
group had no specific learning process to reflect upon.
Data processing 
The options on the quantitative scales of Instrument 1 were assigned the values 0 
to 3 in the categories ‘context’ and ‘situation of agent’: 0 for ‘fits not at all’, and 3 for 
‘fits very well’. In the category ‘presentist’, a reverse scoring was applied, because 
viewing a presentist consideration as fitting is proof of bad historical perspective 
reconstruction. This implies that total scores for the instrument could vary between 
0 and 27, representing minimal and maximal performance in historical perspective 
reconstruction. Sub-scores for the three subscales could vary between 0 and 9. The 
validity and reliability of the instruments were determined by means of a principal 
component analysis, and calculating the Cronbach’s alphas. As these data answer one 
of our research questions, we present the results in the ‘Findings’ section.
The textual data from Instrument 2 were scored quantitatively as well as analysed 
qualitatively. We searched for elements of ‘rational judgement of the past’ as described 
in Table 1. The number of elements found was scored for each text. The number of 
words written per text was counted.
Qualitative analysis of the data consisted of searching for the kind of arguments 
given by students. We mainly looked for differences in the kind of arguments used in 
the intervention and comparison groups. In addition, we looked for the words that 
were used to describe situations and persons, and whether they fitted with students’ 
judgement.
The data from the learner reports were analysed qualitatively. We looked for the 
kind of arguments with which students substantiated their views on whether or not it 
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is useful to try to reconstruct past perspectives and whether or not the three-stage 
model was experienced as useful.
Table 1: Scoring categories for written assignments (Instrument 2)
Category Example sentences
Student regards historical agent as a 
rationally acting person
‘This job is the only means of existence for 
her and her family, why would she risk losing 
it	by	going	on	strike?	It	is	a	sensible	choice.’
Student identifies him-/herself as a historical 
agent who imagines the situation
‘I think that if I were religious in that period, 
I would as a poor man also be susceptible to 
lies.’
The historical agent’s actions are judged from 
the context of the historical period
‘The factory boss can still live off his reserves 
for some time, but someone like Anna 
cannot do that.’
Findings
Principal component analyses executed for the pre- and post-test quantitative 
instruments based on eigenvalues larger than 1 with varimax rotation and Kaiser 
normalization revealed in both cases four factors explaining 61.6 per cent (pre-test) 
and 63.0 per cent (post-test) of variance. These appeared to coincide in no way with the 
subcategories ‘presentist’, ‘situation of agent’ and ‘context’. Each contained variables 
from two or three different subscales in either of the tests. However, it could be argued 
that even if no subscales were detected, the sum scores represented in fact one 
factor, because ‘presentist’ and ‘context’ complement each other as opposites, while 
‘situation of agent’ could also be seen as a kind of historical context. The subscales 
appearing to be non-existent, we only calculated Cronbach’s alphas for the complete 
instruments, which were 0.22 for the pre-test and 0.50 for the post-test. 
These are unacceptably low values. Therefore, the adapted versions of 
Hartmann and Hasselhorn’s (2008) standardized measure proved to be unreliable. 
This conclusion is underlined if we analyse the total scores for the pre- and post-
tests for both groups, as presented in Table 2. We detected no statistically significant 
differences, neither between the two groups on the pre-test (F=0.098, p=0.654) nor on 
the post-test (F=2.325, p=0.647), nor between pre- and post-test within either of the 
groups (respectively: t=1.34, p=0.189 and t=1.26, p=0.215). Therefore, it has proven 
impossible to measure differences in the ability of students to reconstruct historical 
perspectives, between groups or before and after the intervention.
Table 2: Quantitative assessments of historical perspective reconstruction 
(Instrument 1)
Group Score
Comparison group Pre-test 17.0
Post-test 18.0
Intervention group Pre-test 17.5
Post-test 18.3
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Quantitative scoring of the numbers of elements of ‘rational judgement of the past’ 
in the students’ written judgements of the historical agents’ decisions revealed the 
totals represented in Table 3. There appeared to be no significant difference between 
pre- and post-test in the comparison group (t=0.000, p=1.000), nor in the intervention 
group (t=1.711, p=0.096), although in this case, the t- and p-values were such that this 
suggests a ‘trend’. The difference between the groups appeared to be not significant 
at the pre-test (F=0.462, p=0.134), but at the post-test it was significant (F=0.333, 
p=0.011). At the pre-test, the intervention group wrote 79 words on average and the 
comparison group 69 words. At the post-test these averages were 84 and 53 words 
respectively. The intervention group wrote longer answers after the intervention, 
thus probably adding more nuance to their judgements. All of this suggests that the 
intervention group’s level of historical perspective reconstruction had improved, while 
in the comparison group it had remained more or less the same.
Table 3: Elements of rational judgement of the past in students’ written assessments 
(Instrument 2)
Intervention group
N=36
Comparison group
N=33
pre-test post-test pre-test post-test
TOTAL 52 62 40 38
Looking at qualitative aspects of the students’ answers, a difference between the 
groups was the extent to which reasoning showed characteristics of ‘superiority of 
the present’, which occurred to a greater extent in the comparison group than in 
the intervention group. For example: ‘I find it very strange that people risk their lives 
for someone they do not even know’. In the intervention group, the context of the 
historical period was taken more into account. For example: ‘I would not go, but 
Joseph was strictly religious – not me, so I would not use that as a motive, but in his 
case chances are that he saw it as an extra encouragement.’ Looking at the kind of 
words used to describe situations and people, the comparison group more often used 
words such as ‘strange’, ‘ridiculous’ or ‘incomprehensible’ at their post-test. In both 
the pre- and post-test, almost all students argued from the personal circumstances of 
the agent, in which cases it seemed as if they were reasoning from their own present-
day perspective. For example: ‘Anna and her family are in a bad condition already, if 
she also loses her job because of the strike, she does not have anything anymore.’ And 
in the post-test: ‘I would not go because of the sick daughter’, and: ‘He put his family 
in insecurity, so I think it’s a wrong choice’. Reasoning from personal circumstances of 
the agent therefore seems to be no guarantee for a genuine historical point of view. 
From the learner reports, it was obvious that students experienced the 
assignments to reconstruct perspectives of historical agents as a difficult cognitive 
endeavour. For example: ‘Understanding a person from history can be very difficult, 
because you have to distance yourself as much as possible from your own standards 
and values.’ And: ‘You have to imagine a different era and consider whether there 
was freedom, what position everyone had, etc. Our experiences now are just very 
different.’ All students were able to report about the intervention process, with varying 
points of view. On the question of whether they would use the three-stage model in 
the future, some commented that they did not see this happening soon, while one 
84 Wilschut and Schiphorst
History Education Research Journal 16 (1) 2019
student reported: ‘I will use perspective reconstruction and judging a bit more often 
than usual, but I myself had the idea that I had already mastered it.’
A considerable number of students, however, wrote that using the three stage 
model would facilitate proper judgement and that they expected to score better 
results on tests by using it. This gain was seen as a cognitive advantage, for example: 
‘You don’t just learn the facts, but you also understand events much better’, and ‘I 
think this can be used outside history, it teaches you to be more critical’. Elaborating 
on their learning processes, students frequently mentioned the three-stage model, as 
well as the assignments on Robespierre and Jefferson: ‘The teacher instructions let us 
experience what this is about, but we mainly learned by doing the various exercises’, 
and ‘I learned by the short texts about people who had to make an important choice. 
Then you really had to think about what was going on in their minds.’ Students more 
than once indicated that they enjoyed learning about this aspect of history: ‘History 
is quite factual, that’s why I like to learn how to view those facts correctly so that I 
can get an impression of what really happened’, and ‘I enjoyed seeing something 
from someone else’s perspective’. The affective component here is the enjoyment of 
better understanding, not the feeling for other people. For students, reconstructing 
past perspectives is a cognitive procedure, which is useful for better insights into the 
past and fostering critical thinking.
Conclusion and discussion
It has proved impossible to measure shifts in historical perspective reconstruction 
by means of adapted versions of Hartmann and Hasselhorn’s (2008) quantitative 
‘standardized measure’. Admittedly, the small size of our samples made it difficult 
to apply quantitative methods, and perhaps the case of a nineteenth-century factory 
girl was significantly different from the one about a prospective crusader. Even so, we 
applied the three categories discerned by Hartmann and Hasselhorn (ibid.) in both 
cases, but were unable to retrieve them in either case separately by means of principal 
component analysis. The reliability of either instrument proved to be unacceptably low. 
Total results of both tests suggested that nothing changed, while our other findings 
suggest that in fact something did change in the intervention group’s dealing with 
historical perspective reconstruction. 
In previous research, it has also proved difficult to produce adapted versions of 
Hartmann and Hasselhorn’s ‘standardized measure’ (Huijgen et al., 2014). That contextual 
knowledge plays a decisive role here, as we have argued in our theoretical framework, 
is underlined by a closer study of Hartmann and Hasselhorn’s instrument. In their case, 
a young man in Germany in 1930 had to decide whether or not to vote for Hitler. 
All considerations in the instrument not to vote for Hitler represented the ‘presentist’ 
category, while all considerations to vote for Hitler represented the ‘contextual’ 
category. The considerations representing ‘the situation of the agent’ implied voting 
for ‘an anti-democratic party, but not necessarily the NSDAP’. That the categories 
‘presentist’ and ‘contextual’ neatly fitted into one line with two extremes, is therefore 
not surprising, because one either votes for Hitler or not. Besides, from their general 
contextual knowledge about Hitler, students must have known that a large proportion 
of Germans in the 1930s voted for Hitler, which made the ‘contextual’ choices more 
likely. In our examples, the contextual knowledge was less self-evident and the choices 
whether or not to strike or go on a crusade were mixed in the ‘presentist’, ‘contextual’ 
and ‘situation of agent’ categories. After all, in the nineteenth century, some people 
decided to strike, and others decided not to strike, and in the Middle Ages, some 
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people went on a crusade, while others did not. In these circumstances, Hartmann and 
Hasselhorn’s model does not hold. So there are reasons to believe that theirs is not a 
‘standardized measure’ for assessing historical perspective reconstruction; more so, 
if we take into account that application of their quantitative instrument suggests that 
the levels of historical empathy with senior secondary students is generally adequate 
(Hartmann and Hasselhorn, 2008; Huijgen et al., 2014), while other research based on 
qualitative methods signals serious deficiencies (Rantala, 2011; Rantala et al., 2016).
This does not exclude that quantitative methods can be applied. Our – 
admittedly rather crude – method of counting instances of rational judgement in the 
students’ evaluations of the historical agents’ decisions suggested some improvement 
in the intervention group, while the comparison group more or less remained the 
same. This impression was underlined and nuanced by our qualitative data. Therefore, 
this combination of quantitative and qualitative methods (Kelle, 2006) suggests 
that Hartmann and Hasselhorn’s (2008) implementation of the construct ‘historical 
perspective taking’ is not satisfactory, and that the three elements of ‘rational 
understanding’ that we employed in our second instrument might be a useful starting 
point for further research.
Our qualitative data gave more nuance to the impressions generated by 
the numbers of ‘rational understanding’ elements that students included in their 
judgements of historical agents’ decisions. From the learner reports, it is safe to 
conclude that most students in the intervention group thought they had learned 
something worthwhile that could make history more interesting and understandable. 
Another suggestion from these reports is that students did not consider the practice of 
historical perspective reconstruction as something affective, but rather as a demanding 
cognitive operation. 
Based on theoretical considerations as well as our empirical findings, we propose 
to see the reconstruction of historical perspectives as a specific element of historical 
explanation, not as a separate concept of ‘historical empathy’ or ‘historical perspective 
taking’. We have therefore preferred the term ‘historical perspective reconstruction’ in 
this paper instead of ‘historical perspective taking’. There are a number of important 
disadvantages in trying to empathically ‘take’ the perspective of some historical agent. 
Empathy is biased, even in interactions in the present, implying that we inadvertently 
try to impose our own assumptions and ideas on those of others, and that we have 
personal preferences about those with whom we wish to empathize and those with 
whom we do not wish to do so (Bloom, 2016: 70, 108). Nilsen (2016) has demonstrated 
that the inclination to empathize with victims in history is considerably stronger than 
the inclination to empathize with perpetrators, more so in cases that are more recent 
than in distant historical cases. All of this indicates that assignments to ‘put oneself 
into the shoes’ of historical agents might be disadvantageous to correct historical 
understanding.
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